Goodbye to Concurring Opinions by Penrose, Meg
Texas A&M University School of Law 
Texas A&M Law Scholarship 
Faculty Scholarship 
1-2020 
Goodbye to Concurring Opinions 
Meg Penrose 
Texas A&M University School of Law, megpenrose@law.tamu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 
 Part of the Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Meg Penrose, Goodbye to Concurring Opinions, 15 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol'y 25 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1395 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 




















   





   
  
GOODBYE TO CONCURRING 
OPINIONS 
MEG PENROSE ∗ 
ABSTRACT
Modern Supreme Court opinions are too long. They are too 
fractured. And they often lack clarity. Separate opinions, particularly
concurring opinions, are largely to blame. Today’s justices are more
inclined to publish separate opinions than their predecessors.The justices
do not want to read lengthy briefs but appear willing to publish lengthy 
opinions. Yet the justices owe us clarity. They should want the law to be 
understandable—and understood. In hopes of achieving greater legal 
clarity, this article calls for an end to concurring opinions.
The modern Court writes more separate opinions than past courts. It 
is becoming far too common that in a given term there will be more 
separate opinions than majority opinions. This is causing problems for 
judges, lawyers, law students, and ordinary Americans. Surely most cases 
do not necessitate separate writing. Whether these separate opinions are 
driven by ego, politics, law clerks, celebrity, a desire to be a part of the 
legal “conversation,” or the refusal to accept that a particular justice’s 
approach failed to garner sufficient votes to serve as the majority
opinion, they should stop. A return to seriatim opinions poses 
institutional risks. Rarely do concurring opinions become future law.
Little is gained through concurring opinions. It is time to discard the 
myth that an add-on opinion will one day become binding precedent. It
rarely happens. And the regular costs are not worth the rare advantages.
This article seeks Supreme Court reform. The justices should
voluntarily agree to stop writing concurring opinions. My thesis is
simple: it is time to say goodbye to concurring opinions.
Copyright © 2020 Meg Penrose 
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INTRODUCTION
Quick! List the U.S. Supreme Court’s five most impactful 
concurring opinions. Better yet, list the top ten. Do they readily come
to mind? How long did it take you? Are these cases taught regularly? 
Have any more than the first five actually become the law? This article
challenges the belief that separate opinions, particularly concurrences,
are justified because they often become the law.That is factually untrue.
And it is even less likely for modern cases decided by the Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts.
The current problem is easily shown. In analyzing whether a six-
foot statue of the Ten Commandments could remain on the Texas State 
Capitol grounds, the Court introduced its decision as follows: 
REHNQUIST, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, and
THOMAS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., and THOMAS, J., filed
concurring opinions. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the 
judgment. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
GINSBURG, J., joined. O’CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS and
GINSBURG, JJ., joined.1 
1. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 679 (2005) (internal citations omitted). The justices’
multiple opinions span 69 pages (including 3 pages of pictures) and nearly 23,000 words. Even
after all this reading, because of the Court’s fractured approach, the case offers a plurality opinion
with insufficient guidance regarding religious monuments on public land. The companion case,
decided the same day and addressing a similar question about the posting of the 10
Commandments on public property, spawned 3 separate opinions and covered 68 pages. See
McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 844–912 (2005). 












   
 
  
   
 
   
  
       
   
 
   
 
   
   
 
    
 
   
    
   
  
  
   
 272020] GOODBYE TO CONCURRING OPINIONS
This introduction, announcing multiple separate opinions, is 
becoming increasingly common.2 In fact, the Burger, Rehnquist, and
Roberts Courts have consistently averaged near 60% for decisions 
containing at least one dissenting opinion and roughly 40% for
decisions containing at least one concurring opinion.3 This
individualized writing approach should stop.
My thesis is simple: it is time to say goodbye to concurring opinions. 
Modern Supreme Court opinions are too long. They are too 
fractured. And they often lack clarity.  Separate opinions, particularly 
concurring opinions, are largely to blame.  Litigants practicing before
the Court are not permitted to approach the law like the justices. Our 
writing is constrained.4 In 2019 the Court shrunk the length of litigants’
merits briefs from 15,000 to 13,000 words.5 This proposal came as the 
Roberts Court itself continued to break verbosity records for average 
opinion length.6 We are also required to be clear and concise.7 Supreme
Court Rule 14 permits denial of certiorari based solely on a Petition’s 
lack of clarity.8 What if the Court had to live by its own rules? Would
opinions change, becoming more succinct and understandable? Would 
the law? 
The modern Court has drifted far from John Marshall’s unified and 
institutionally-minded Court.9 Seeking institutional respect, Chief 
2. See Nancy Maveety, The Era of the Choral Court, 89 JUDICATURE 138, 138 (2005–06)
(highlighting the increasing practice of issuing concurring opinions at the Supreme Court). 
3. Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 769, 782 (2015). 
4. See SUP. CT. R. 33(g) (July 1, 2019). Certiorari petitions are limited to 9,000 words. Merits
briefs filed by the parties are limited to 13,000 words.
5. Prior to this Rule change, litigants had 15,000 words to argue their case.  The Court felt
this was too much.  See SUP. CT. R. 33 (Proposed Revisions to the Rules of the Supreme Court of
the United States, November 2018). The comment to this proposed change states: 
Experience has shown that litigants in the Court are able to present their arguments
effectively, and without undue repetition, with word limits slightly reduced from those 
under the current rule. Reductions similarly designed were implemented for briefs in
the federal courts of appeals in 2016.
 6. Adam Liptak, Justices Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, 
at A24.
 7. See SUP. CT. R. 24.6 (requiring that merits briefs “be concise, logically arranged with
proper headings, and free of irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matter. The Court may
disregard or strike a brief that does not comply with this paragraph.”) Id. 
8. SUP. CT. R. 14.4 states that “[t]he failure of a petition to present with accuracy, brevity,
and clarity whatever is essential to ready and adequate understanding of the points requiring
consideration is sufficient reason for the Court to deny a petition.” 
9. See, e.g., Maveety, supra note 2, at 139 (“Apparently, the Rehnquist justices
conceptualized both ‘the Court’s outputs’ and their contribution to them in a more individualistic
fashion than the cohorts of justices from past eras.”).
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Justice Marshall encouraged the justices to issue an Opinion of the 
Court—singular.10 Our current Chief, John Roberts, laments that 
“during Marshall’s thirty years as chief, ‘there weren’t a lot of
concurring opinions.There weren’t a lot of dissents.And nowadays, you 
take a look at some of our opinions and you wonder if we’re reverting 
back to the English model, where everybody has to have their say. It’s 
more being concerned with the jurisprudence of the individual rather 
than working toward a jurisprudence of the Court.’”11 Today, despite 
Chief Justice Roberts’s hope for a more unified approach, the justices 
regularly issue individual concurring and dissenting opinions.12 These 
separate opinions, often restating the objections of other concurring or 
dissenting justices, generally add length without adding clarity.13 The
tone can be overtly personal, lacking in professionalism and civility.14 It 
is as if the Constitution’s promise of “one Supreme Court” has broken
down into nine component parts. Have we returned to the days of 
seriatim opinions? 
In the spirit of Justice Roberts’s call for “a jurisprudence of the 
Court,” this article calls for an end to concurring opinions. “In the 2009
Term, over three-quarters of the opinions published by the Supreme 
Court of the United States included a concurring opinion written by an
individual Justice; an astounding record for the High Court.”15 Unlike
dissenting opinions, which at least take issue with the result,
concurrences express disagreement while clinging to the majority’s 
result. In other words, the concurring justice, having lost the persuasive
battle in having his or her opinion serve as the Court’s reasoning, seeks 
to publish that same discarded opinion and circumvent the Court’s 
vote. It is an anti-democratic approach to opinion writing. By definition,
the concurring justice was not selected to draft the Court’s opinion.16 
10. Id.
 11. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 2007), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/01/robertss-rules/305559/. 
12. Chief Justice Roberts admonished, “I think that every justice should be worried about
the Court acting as a Court and functioning as a Court, and they should all be worried, when
they’re writing separately, about the effect on the Court as an institution.” Id. 
13. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (featuring multiple separate 
opinions presenting the individual justices’ perspectives, but adding no new law).
 14. See Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 
237, 282 (2008) (“An opinion that veers into a personal attack on another judge is often deficient 
in legal analysis.”). 
15. Ryan M. Moore, I Concur—Do I Matter: Developing a Framework for Determining the
Precedential Influence of Concurring Opinions, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 743, 743 (2012). 
16. See Maveety, supra note 2, at 138 (explaining concurrence-based opinions are not the 
result of majority opinion directives). 


















   
 
 
   
   
     
  
      
  




     
   
  
  
   
 
    
       
 
 292020] GOODBYE TO CONCURRING OPINIONS
But, using his or her prerogative to draft an individual opinion, the 
justice refuses to yield and seeks to either limit, undermine, or actually 
argue against the law crafted by the Court’s majority opinion.
Sometimes the justice discusses issues neither raised nor briefed,
providing readers with obiter dictum and added work.17 Worse still, this
individualized approach can lead to a plurality opinion that wastes the 
scarce judicial resources a Supreme Court opinion offers. Such was the
case with the Ten Commandments example above.18 
Varying arguments are given to support concurring opinions.19 
None are persuasive. Legal disputes are binary. In each case—which 
the Court is tasked with resolving—there is a winner and a loser.20 Why
should the justices be permitted to write separately if they side with the
winner? What value is there in multiple individualized judicial opinions 
all reaching the same end result? “Concurrences destroy the clarity and 
authority of a majority opinion, without adding the principled
disagreement of a dissent. Compared with dissents, concurrences 
appear as judicial sour grapes.”21 
Arguments supporting individual opinions, including concurrences,
claim that: (1) separate opinions appeal to the wisdom of a future day
and eventually become law;22 (2) separate opinions provide litigants 
17. There are serious opportunity costs to lengthy, unfocused Supreme Court opinions.
These include increased time needed by students to study the law and discern the holding of a
case, practicing lawyers who have to ensure they remain up to date on the law, and lower courts
which regularly have a much larger work (and opinion writing load) than Supreme Court Justices.
See Lebovits et al., supra note 14, at 255. 
18. See supra text accompanying note 1.
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 22–26.
 20. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Federal courts are limited to hearing cases involving disputes
between parties and are not vested with any power to issue advisory opinions. Id.
21. Thomas B. Bennett et al., Divide & Concur: Separate Opinions & Legal Change, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 817, 837 (2018). 
22. Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, SUP. CT. HISTORICAL SOCIETY J. 33, 35 (1994). 
Regarding dissents, Justice Scalia observed that:
When history demonstrates that one of the Court’s decisions has been a truly 
horrendous mistake, it is comforting—and conducive of respect for the Court—to look
back and realize that at least some of the Justices saw the danger clearly, and gave voice,
often eloquent voice, to their concern. 
Id. In this same lecture, however, Scalia conceded that, “[a]t the Supreme Court level . . . a dissent
rarely helps change the law.” Id. at 37. “Even more rarely does a separate concurring opinion
have the effect of shaping the future law—rarely but not never.” Id. But see Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Printz, 
after noting that while the parties did not raise the question of whether “the substantive right 
safeguarded by the Second Amendment . . . is read to confer a personal right to ‘keep and bear
arms,’” went on to footnote the growing historical evidence and commentary supporting such a
reading. Id. at 938–939. He presciently, continued that “[p]erhaps, at some future date, this Court
will have the opportunity to determine whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the
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with road-maps for future cases;23 (3) separate opinions improve and
sharpen the majority opinion;24 (4) separate opinions assure the losing 
party that all arguments were adequately considered;25 and, (5) 
separate opinions ensure that the justices are not being “lazy” or 
protecting incompetent colleagues.26 
These arguments are unconvincing when considering the added 
length and lost clarity of numerous separate opinions. First, separate 
decisions, particularly under the modern Court, rarely become law.27 
Second, a Court opinion should decide a case (or object to its decision),
not provide legal signposts to gin up future litigation. Third, in a
Supreme Court staffed with extraordinary thinkers—arguably the best 
legal minds in our country—arguments 3, 4 and 5 ring hollow. Surely,
the justices do not need to publish multiple opinions in each case to 
sharpen one another’s thinking. In fact, overlapping opinions can
confuse even the justices themselves, as noted by Justice Alito’s oral 
introduction of the Court’s plurality decision in Williams v. Illinois: “We 
granted certiorari and now affirm. Anyone interested in understanding 
the Court’s holding will have to read our opinions.”28 Finally, the 
Court’s credibility can be undermined when a displeased justice 
suggests that something outside the arguments presented was 
considered or, worse still, motivated the decision. As one article noted,
a published opinion should be a legal tool, not a spectacle.29 
This article seeks Supreme Court reform. The justices should
voluntarily agree to stop writing concurring opinions. Recognizing the 
justices are loath to restrict themselves,30 the American Bar Association 
right to bear arms ‘has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic.’” Id. 
at 939. Eleven years later, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008), established a limited personal Second Amendment right.
 23. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (Thomas, J., concurring) (providing the template for Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008)).
 24. See Scalia, supra note 222, at 41 (writing that dissents are “sure cures for laziness” and 
cause the writer of the majority opinion to refine its reasoning).
25. Richard B. Stephens, The Function of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts of 
Last Resort, 5 FLA. L. REV. 394, 395–96 (1952). 
26. See Scalia, supra note 22, at 34 (wherein President Thomas Jefferson openly stated that 
the practice of a single court opinion “is certainly convenient for the lazy, the modest and the 
incompetent”). 
27. See Scalia, supra note 22, at 37. 
28. Oral comments from Justice Alito introducing Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012). 
29. Lebovits et al., supra note 14, at 250.
 30. See, e.g., THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2019). This ethical code does not apply to the justices. Id. at 2. Instead, the code explicitly
states that it only “applies to United States circuit judges, district judges, Court of International
Trade judges, Court of Federal Claims judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges.” Id. 


















   
 







    
  
     
  
 
         
 312020] GOODBYE TO CONCURRING OPINIONS
(“ABA”) should consider reinstituting Judicial Canon 19, seeking an
end to excessive individualized opinions.31 Lower courts need the
clarity that a single Supreme Court majority opinion gives. Our country
needs to retreat from an overly politicized judiciary compounded by 
emphasizing individual justices over the institution of the Court. It is 
time for the justices to put institutional needs above individuality.32 
Rather than return to the pre-Marshall era of seriatim opinions, it is
time to return to the Marshallian approach restoring institutional faith 
in the Court. It is time for an end to concurring opinions. 
I. HISTORY OF SEPARATE OPINIONS
To help give perspective, a brief historical description is necessary.
Early American courts often followed the British judicial approach.
But, as American courts evolved, we began to adopt our own writing
traditions. This section traces those developments. 
A. The British Approach 
The early British system used two approaches for reporting decided
cases.33 The first, originating in an early 17th century Privy Council 
Order, prohibited separate opinions.34 This tradition, which required 
that “[w]hen the business is to be carried by the most voices, no 
publication is afterwards to be made by any man, how the particular 
voices and opinions went,” was enshrined by Parliament in the 19th 
century.35 Interestingly, this same approach took hold in Pennsylvania 
and Louisiana, where dissenting opinions in the state Supreme Courts 
were legislatively prohibited. In Pennsylvania, the rule could be
Congress is currently seeking to change this and require that the justices also be bound by some
ethical code.   
31. American Bar Association, Canons of Judicial Ethics (1924). Canon 19, entitled Judicial
Opinions, admonished that “[a] judge should not yield to pride of opinion or value more highly
his individual reputation than that of the court to which he should be loyal. Except in case of
conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be
discouraged in courts of last resort.” Id. Because concurring opinions were not a common feature
in 1924, there was no similar dissuasion directed specifically at concurring opinions. However, the 
spirit of Canon 19 clearly envisions institutional interests will be placed above individual interests,
if possible, when writing separate opinions.
32. This remedy was previously suggested, and ignored, in 1959. See Karl M. ZoBell, 
Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.
REV. 186, 209–14 (1959) (advocating for the Court’s re-adoption of Canon 19).
33. For an excellent history on the British system, including the King’s Bench and Thomas 
Jefferson’s support of its seriatim approach, see id. at 187–91. 
34. Alex Simpson, Jr., Dissenting Opinions, 3 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 207 (1923).
 35. Id. 
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circumvented only when the dissenting justice individually paid for 
publication of the separate opinion.36 
In contrast to the Privy Council decisions, the House of Lords 
would freely publish each judges’ opinion, allowing the “antagonistic 
views” to be publicly aired.37 Legal observers then combed through the 
separate opinions to determine what the Court (as an institution) 
decided.38 The upside was transparency. The downsides were both a 
lack of clarity and the effort required to understand what the Court 
held.
B. The Supreme Court’s Early Approach 
The early U.S. Supreme Court, though inconsistent in its practices,
largely followed the British Law Lords’ practice of separate, seriatim 
opinions.39 Each justice, speaking for himself, would issue an opinion.
Beginning with the junior justice, the justices in turn would state their 
individual reasons for deciding each case.40 Lawyers were expected to 
discern the Court’s holding by analyzing the separate opinions.41 
Our fourth Chief Justice, John Marshall, abandoned the seriatim 
approach.42 Early in his tenure Marshall determined there should be a 
single opinion “for the Court.”43 This approach emulated the British 
Privy Council.The Privy Council, in speaking for the King, necessitated 
a singular pronouncement.44 And, while Chief Justice Marshall did not
literally prohibit separate opinions, he successfully persuaded his 
colleagues that a single opinion would add credibility and authority to 
the Court’s decisions.45 Marshall’s approach of a single opinion also
36. Id. at 206. The Pennsylvania Act of 1845 mandated that “no minority opinion” of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court could be published. Id. at 207–08. This mandate, it appears, was
often honored more in the breach. Id. at 208–09. 
37. Id. at 207.
 38. Laura K. Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore: The History of the Supreme Court’s Use of the
Per Curiam Opinion, 79 NEB. L. REV. 517, 530–31 (2000). 
39. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790– 
1945, 77 WASH. U. L. REV. 137, 139–41 (1999).
40. Evan A. Evans, The Dissenting Opinion-Its Use and Abuse, 3 MO. L. REV. 120, 120 
(1938). 
41. See Ray, supra note 38, at 531.
42. Unlike the British, where Lord Mansfield eliminated the seriatim approach only during
his time on the King’s Bench, Marshall instituted permanent change. Marshall’s unusually long
tenure on the Court may explain, in part, why the British returned to seriatim opinions and the 
Americans held on to Marshall’s change. See ZoBell, supra note 32, at 190–193. 
43. Id.
 44. Simpson, Jr., supra note 34, at 207.
 45. See Scalia, supra note 222, at 35 (noting Marshall himself dissented only 9 times in his 34-
year career).























     
 
   
 
 






   
    
   
   
 
 332020] GOODBYE TO CONCURRING OPINIONS
corresponded with the Constitutional command that there shall be 
“one Supreme Court.”46 
Not everyone appreciated Marshall’s approach. President 
Jefferson, himself a distinguished lawyer,47 famously assailed
Marshall’s goal of a single Court opinion, lamenting: 
An opinion is huddled up in conclave, perhaps by a majority of one,
delivered as if unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of lazy
or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge, who sophisticates the law 
to his own mind, by the turn of his own reasoning.48 
Jefferson “favored a return to ‘the sound practice of the primitive
court’ of delivering seriatim opinions.”49 Jefferson was not only 
concerned with transparency. He appreciated that the only
constitutional check on the justices was impeachment.50 Jefferson 
believed the practice of a single court opinion shielded the justices from
proper public scrutiny for impeachable conduct.51 In a letter to Justice
Johnson, Jefferson observed that the justices “holding their offices for 
life are under two responsibilities only: 1. Impeachment. 2. Individual 
Reputation. But this practice [of a single court opinion] completely 
withdraws them from both . . . . [T]he opinion therefore ever so 
impeachable, having been done in the dark it can be proved by no
one.”52 
Despite Jefferson’s frustration, the practice of a single Court 
opinion stuck. For most of Marshall’s tenure, the Court spoke with one
voice.53 And in that first instance where a justice wrote separately—in
46. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The Framers vested “[t]he judicial Power of the United States . . .
in one Supreme Court.” Id. The Constitution does not establish, or even mention, the number of
justices to be placed on this Court. Id. The only individualization provided is connected to the
judge’s office (or job security): “Judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.” Id. 
47. See generally FRANK L. DEWEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON LAWYER (1986).
 48. ZoBell, supra note 32, at 194.
 49. Id.
 50. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (noting that justices receive lifetime appointments and are 
only removed from the Court for violating norms of good behavior).
 51. ZoBell, supra note 32, at 194 (suggesting that each justice should be compelled to 
announce his own views in every case before the court).
 52. See Scalia, supra note 222, at 34. 
53. See Russell Smyth & Paresh Narayan, Multiple Regime Shifts in Concurring and 
Dissenting Opinions on the U.S. Supreme Court, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 79, 84 (2006)
(“[F]or most of the first two decades of his period on the Court, Johnson acquiesced in Marshall’s
unanimity rule. At the urging of Jefferson to resist Marshall’s centralization of power in
Washington though, during his last 10 years on the Court, Johnson became more vocal in speaking
out, issuing nine concurring and 18 dissenting opinions.”).
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a concurrence, no less—his colleagues responded unfavorably.54 The
third governmental branch needed legitimacy and one opinion “for the 
Court” helped provide it. 
C. The Dawn of Separate Opinions 
Not until the late 1930s did separate opinions become common.55 
Between 1912 and 1921, separate dissenting opinions were written in 
less than one half of one percent of all cases.56 In fact, it was Justice
Felix Frankfurter who opened the door to separate opinion writing in
a 1939 concurring opinion. In Graves v. New York,57 Justice Frankfurter 
wrote: 
I join in the Court’s opinion, but deem it appropriate to add a few
remarks. The volume of the Court’s business has long since made
impossible the early healthy practice whereby the Justices gave
expression to individual opinions. But the old tradition still has
relevance when an important shift in constitutional doctrine is 
announced after a reconstruction in the membership of the Court.
Such shifts of opinion should not derive from mere private 
judgment. They must be duly mindful of the necessary demands of
continuity in civilized society.58 
This short concurring opinion resurrected the pre-Marshallian 
approach of expressing individual opinions. Shortly after Frankfurter’s 
call for individual opinions, Justice Black issued a lengthy eighteen-
page dissent from a per curiam opinion.59 
Justice Frankfurter also was the first to author a separate dubitante 
opinion—a rare drafting technique that is neither a concurrence nor a 
dissent.60 Many court observers remain unfamiliar with the dubitante 
54. See Meredith K. Lewis, Justice William Johnson and the History of Supreme Court 
Dissent, 83 GEO. L.J. 2069, 2077–78 (1995) (“In fact, he issued a substantial concurrence in one of
his first opinions, only to be severely rebuked by other Justices.”).
 55. Smyth & Narayan, supra note 53, at 79 (indicating that “most studies of decision-making 
on the U.S. Supreme Court have focused on the 1930s or early 1940s as the period at which the 
consensual norm on the Court broke down”).
 56. See Simpson, Jr., supra note 34, at 10 (writing that of the 2349 opinions filed during the 
period, approximately 125 dissenting opinions were filed and dissents were noted for an
additional 180 opinions but were not filed).
57. 306 U.S. 466 (1939). 
58. Id. at 487.
 59. See Ray, supra note 38, at 520 (“In a solitary dissent of almost eighteen pages, Justice
Black strongly attacked the Court’s results on several grounds . . . .”).
60. Jason J. Czarnezki, The Dubitante Opinion, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (noting that 
the term dubitante has been written in 12 Supreme Court cases and was used in reference to a
case disposition four times).
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opinion. The dubitante opinion has been used four times in Supreme
Court history.61 Introduced in 1948 by Justice Rutledge,62 Frankfurter 
was the first Justice to actually write a separate dubitante opinion.63 
Unlike a concurrence, the dubitante expresses doubt without otherwise 
diminishing the Court’s majority opinion. A return to the dubitante
practice seems preferable to the sea of lengthy, separate opinions 
currently populating the U.S. Reports.64 This approach would allow 
those with principled concerns that fall short of dissension to note 
disagreement without adding to opinion length or institutional
instability. A brief dubitante notation serves the law’s binary approach
better than a separate concurrence.
D. The Supreme Court’s Current Approach 
Today, separate opinions are far more likely than a united Court.65 
This remains true even in per curiam opinions—those handed down
“by the Court” without assigning authorship of the opinion to any 
particular justice.66 Per curiam opinions were historically used for 
simple cases, those lacking controversy or needing extensive 
explanation.67 Yet today, the multiplicity of published opinions, even in 
61. See Case-Swayne Co., Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 403 (1967) (Douglas,
J., dubitante); O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc. 380 U.S. 359 (1965)
(Douglas, J., dubitante); Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., dubitante); Rwy. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949)
(Rutledge, J., dubitante).
 62. See Rwy. Express Agency, Inc., 336 U.S. at 110 (“Mr. Justice Rutledge acquiesces in the 
Court’s opinion and judgment, dubitante on the question of equal protection of the laws.”). Unlike
Justices Frankfurter and Douglas, who are responsible for the three other dubitante opinions,
Rutledge did not actually attach a separate opinion to his dubitante notation.
 63. Frankfurter’s dubitante spanned 6 pages. Radio Corp., 341 U.S. at 421–427. It began, 
“[s]ince I am not alone in entertaining doubts about this case they had better be stated[,]” id. at 
421.
64. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 149 (1990)
(describing Judge Richard Posner’s preference for the dubitante opinion over concurring opinions
that simply suggest minor reservations, include additional reasons for the opinion, or criticize a 
dissenting opinion). 
65. ZoBell’s observation is as accurate today as when it was written in 1959:
During the last thirty or thirty-five years, division and dissension have become
increasingly notable characteristics of the work of the Supreme Court. Agreement by
all of the Justices as to the proper decision in an important case comes as a pleasant
surprise, when it comes at all.
ZoBell, supra note 32, at 203.
 66. See Ray, supra note 38, at 520 (noting that beginning in the 1930s, per curiam opinions 
began using concurrences and dissents which created “an oxymoronic form, one that 
simultaneously insisted on both institutional consensus and individual disagreement”); see also,
Ira P. Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per Curiam
Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2012). 
67. Robbins, supra note 66, at 1200. 
GOODBYE TO CONCURRING OPINIONS_FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/4/2020 12:59 PM       



















    
   
 









36 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 15
per curiam cases, has rendered the per curiam label “meaningless.”68 As 
Professor Laura Ray explained, beginning in “the 1970s the Court had
adapted the per curiam to a purpose diametrically opposed to its 
original use, producing per curiam opinions accompanied by as many 
as nine separate opinions, each asserting a strong and independent 
position. In its most elaborate incarnations, the per curiam finally 
became its own antithesis, the vehicle for three of the Court’s most
challenging and most splintered constitutional cases of this century.”69 
Perhaps the best example remains Bush v. Gore.70 
The fractured approach continues despite modern justices
themselves condemning the practice. In 1994, Justice Scalia wrote that 
he did not approve of “separate concurrences that are written only to
say the same thing better than the court has done, or worse still, to 
display the intensity of the concurring judge’s feeling on the issue
before the court.”71 He regarded “such separate opinions as an abuse,
and their existence one of the arguments against allowing separate 
opinions at all.”72 Despite this sentiment, and the fact that many 
Americans consider Scalia to be the great modern dissenter,73 he is, in
fact, the “Great Concurrer.”74 Justice Scalia authored more concurring 
opinions than any other justice.75 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, while a judge on the D.C. Circuit,
admonished that “appellate judges might profitably exercise greater 
restraint before writing separately.”76 She noted that “jurists in the
United States might serve the public better if they heightened their 
appreciation of the values so prized in the civil law tradition: clarity and 
certainty in judicial pronouncements.”77 If only the justices heeded 
their own advice.78 
68. Id. at 1198. 
69. Ray, supra note 38, at 520.  
70. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
 71. Scalia, supra note 222, at 33. 
72. Id. 
73. See Antonia Scalia, OYEZ (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.oyez.org/justices/antonin_scalia
(noting that Justice Scalia is ranked third in Supreme Court history for the most dissenting
opinions written). 
74. Id. (suggesting that Justice Scalia ranked first in Supreme Court history for the most
concurring opinions written).
 75. Id. 
76. Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 134.
 77. Id. at 150.
 78. See Maveety, supra note 2, at 139 (noting that by 2005, Justice Ginsburg had written more
concurrences than dissents and her separate writing activities rivaled those of Justice Scalia and
Justice Stevens).
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Chief Justice Roberts has also publicly noted the institutional risks 
associated with separate opinions.79 “‘If the Court in Marshall’s era had 
issued decisions in important cases the way this Court has over the past
thirty years, we would not have a Supreme Court today of the sort that 
we have,’ [Roberts] said.80 ‘That suggests that what the Court’s been
doing over the past thirty years has been eroding, to some extent, the 
capital that Marshall built up.’ Roberts added, ‘I think the Court is also
ripe for a similar refocus on functioning as an institution, because if it 
doesn’t it’s going to lose its credibility and legitimacy as an 
institution.’”81 Considering these remarks, one can’t help asking, what 
has changed for the justices? Both Justices Scalia82 and Ginsburg83 are 
known for their separate opinion writing. Justice Roberts, while not as 
prolific, has similarly contributed to the growing body of individual 
opinions.84 
Why does this matter?  To begin, the Roberts Court decides fewer 
cases than nearly all previous Courts.85 Even with more law clerks than 
past Courts, fewer cases are argued and resolved.86 Yet the lightened 
workload has had an inverse relation to opinion length, if not clarity.
Roberts Court opinions are likely to be more voluminous than all past 
Courts. Empirically, Roberts Court opinions average longer than any 
prior Court.87 They are longer—but not necessarily clearer.88 Imagine 
if instead of writing separately, the Roberts Court put that time and 
energy into seeking consensus and deciding more cases. In the late 19th 
century, the Fuller Court—without any law clerks—issued 265 signed 
opinions.89 In 1923, the Taft Court issued 208 opinions—with only 15
79. Rosen, supra note 11. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. See ANTONIN SCALIA & KEVIN A. RING, SCALIA’S COURT: A LEGACY OF LANDMARK 
OPINIONS AND DISSENTS (2016).
 83. See Maveety, supra note 2, at 139. 
84. See Writings by Justice Roberts, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/roberts.dec.html.
 85. See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking
Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1225 (2012) (“Today’s Supreme Court decides markedly 
fewer cases than its predecessors. Since the 2005 Term, the Court has decided an average of 80
cases per Term, far fewer than the roughly 200 cases it heard earlier in the twentieth century.”).
 86. See id.
 87. See Liptak, supra note 6.
 88. See Meg Penrose, Supreme Verbosity: The Roberts Court’s Expanding Legacy, 102 
MARQ. L. REV. 167, 181 (2018) (“Lawyers, and law students, are reading Supreme Court opinions
that often lack clarity and concision.”).
89. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Past and Present, 59 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 361,
362 (1973). 
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separate dissenting and concurring opinions.90 Thus, one possible
consequence of less individual writing could be a return to deciding 
more cases like past Courts.91 Rather than huddle up with law clerks to
respond to other justices’ writings, the Court could accept more cases 
and seek to provide greater clarity in the cases it decides. The return to 
“one Supreme Court” as Marshall understood it has more up than 
downside.
II. THE MYTH THAT SEPARATE OPINIONS BECOME THE LAW
Supporters of separate opinion writing often declare that separate
opinions—both concurring and dissenting—become the law. The data 
does not bear this out. This claim, which champions Justice Hughes’s 
appeal to the “brooding spirit of the law, the intelligence of a future
day,” is simply not true.92 Separate opinions rarely become future law.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s statement that dissents are generally
“useless” is far closer to the mark.93 Holmes, dubbed “the Great 
Dissenter,” issued only 72 dissenting opinions during his 32 years on
the Court—an average of less than 3 dissents per term.94 Because the 
courts that Holmes sat on decided significantly more cases than the
Roberts Court, this number stands in even starker contrast today than 
it did during the Burger and early Rehnquist Courts. Holmes’s
90. Id. at 363.
 91. But see id. (“Perhaps the Court in recent years has overindulged the tendency to write
separate views, but certainly some increase in separate opinions is a natural and warranted result 
of the increase in constitutional decisions.”).
 92. See CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68
(1928) (“A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the 
dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.”).
93. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400–01 (1904) (Holmes J.,
dissenting) (“I am unable to agree with the judgment of the majority of the court, and although I
think it useless and undesirable, as a rule, to express dissent, I feel bound to do so in this case, and
to give my reasons for it. Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called
great not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some
accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the
judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what 
previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.
What we have to do in this case is to find the meaning of some not very difficult words.”).
 94. See Ray, supra note 38, at 524–31 (noting that Holmes issued his first dissent to a per 
curiam opinion in 1909 and this potentially started the trend of attaching separate opinions to
decisions issued by the Court without individual attribution); see also Evans, supra note 40, at 142
(“[D]uring the first fifty volumes of decisions wherein Justice Holmes participated, he dissented
or joined in dissents in 48 cases. He concurred in 19 additional cases. In the next period covering
forty-eight volumes of Supreme Court Reports he dissented 130 times and wrote concurring
opinions in 20 cases.”).
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assessment that dissents are “useless and undesirable” feels more
accurate today with opinions in controversial cases spawning four, five,
and six separate opinions—sometimes with the separate opinions 
simply repeating the objections of colleagues that are also authoring
separate opinions.95 These individual efforts rarely change the law.96 
Few separate opinions decided by the Burger, Rehnquist or Roberts 
Courts have later become law.97 
When pressed on the point, scholars and lawyers recite a handful of 
cases to support the myth that separate opinions become law. What 
about Dred Scott v. Sandford98 and Plessy v. Ferguson?99  Or, Lochner v.
100 101New York, Abrams v. United States,  and Olmstead v. United
States?102 Five impactful dissenting opinions – the most recent of which
was decided in 1928. These rare instances—five cases dating back 
nearly a century—hardly create an applicable rule.  Rather, as Justice
Scalia acknowledged, “[a]t the Supreme Court level . . . a dissent rarely 
helps change the law.”103 And, going further, Scalia observed that 
95. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (including five separate opinions—one
concurrence and four separate dissents); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (including 
four individually filed dissenting opinions); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (including
five separate opinions—the majority, two concurrences and two dissents.).
 96. But see Samuel Estreicher & Tristan Pelhma-Webb, The Wisdom of Soft Judicial Power: 
Mr. Justice Powell, Concurring, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 229, 231 (2008) (noting two important
instances of change including ratification of the 11th Amendment in response to Chisolm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 429 (1793) and Congress’s action following the Roberts Court’s decision in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007)).
 97. But see Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). In this dissent, Justice Ginsburg directly called on Congress to remedy what the
dissenting justices believed was an important legislative oversight. Her words were unequivocal:
“Once again, the ball is in Congress’ court. As in 1991, the Legislature may act to correct this
Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.” Id. In a rare (and immediate) response, Congress
passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. Interestingly, this case was the classic decisional
model presenting the majority and a single dissenting opinion. Unlike the more fractured opinions
commonly seen in controversial Supreme Court decisions, this case involved a united call to
Congress by the four dissenting justices. 
98. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). The Civil War, and the resulting Fourteenth Amendment, essentially
overturned Dred Scott. 
99. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Plessy was overturned by Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954). 
100. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Lochner majority’s view that due 
process included protections of economic rights was overturned by West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 390 (1937). 
101. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Abrams majority’s “clear-and-
present danger” exception to First Amendment protections was replaced by the narrower
“imminent lawless action” exception in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
102. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Olmstead was overturned by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
 103. Scalia, supra note 22, at 37.  
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“[e]ven more rarely does a separate concurring opinion have the effect 
of shaping the future law—rarely but not never.”104 
To fortify the concurring opinion myth, most cite three noteworthy 
concurrences:  the Steel Seizure case,105 Whitney v. California (which
was originally drafted as a dissenting opinion for the companion 
case),106 and Katz v. United States.107 These three impactful 
concurrences hardly validate the modern practice of justices attaching
multiple concurring opinions to a decision. In fact, most defenders of
the value of concurring opinions champion Katz without 
acknowledging that Katz itself spawned 5 separate opinions: Justice
Stewart’s majority opinion,108 Justice Douglas’s concurrence,109 Justice
Harlan’s concurrence,110 Justice White’s concurrence,111 and, Justice
Black’s dissent.112 Only Harlan’s view survived,113 yet five justices felt 
compelled to voice their thoughts in separate opinions. While Katz was
not as verbose as today’s fractured opinions, its design took hold— 
justices continue to air their separate ideas regardless of future (or even 
current) value.
It is time to discard the myth that a lengthy, add-on opinion will one
day become binding precedent. It rarely happens.And the regular costs 
are not worth the rare advantages.
The justices unquestionably have the freedom to write. But many 
of their modern separate opinions do not read like an appeal to the 
brooding spirit of the law. Rather, they read—page after page—like an
overtly political body seeking to change the law, not one tasked with
“say[ing] what the law is.”114 “The proper functions of an opinion are
104. Id. 
105. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
106. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
 107. 389 U.S. at 347 (1967).
 108. Id.
 109. Id. at 359.
 110. Id. at 360.
 111. Id. at 362.
 112. Id. at 364.
 113. E.g. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
 114. Rosen, supra note 11. In this extensive interview, Justice Roberts praised justices who 
were willing to put the good of the Court above their own ideological agendas. “A justice is not
like a law professor, who might say, ‘This is my theory . . . and this is what I’m going to be faithful
to and consistent with,’ and in twenty years will look back and say, ‘I had a consistent theory of
the First Amendment as applied to a particular area,’” [Roberts] explained. Id. Instead of nine
justices moving in nine separate directions, Roberts said, “it would be good to have a commitment 
on the part of the Court to acting as a Court, rather than being more concerned about the 
consistency and coherency of an individual judicial record.” Id.
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to succinctly express the court’s reasons why it decided as it did, to
develop the law, and to force the author to think through the 
decision.”115 It is not to seek notoriety or forge an independent path.
Often it feels as if “opinions are written less for the litigants than 
for an external audience of like-minded devotees. Justice Ginsburg has 
called [this] playing to the ‘home crowd.’”116 The danger here is that 
such politicization of decisions can lead, and perhaps has led, to “a sort 
of vote-counting approach” detrimental to the Court as an institution 
and the Constitution itself.117 The late Justice Scalia’s tragically 
prescient comments in this regard are worth repeating:
Whenever one of the five Justices in a 5-4 constitutional decision
has been replaced there is a chance, astute counsel must think, of
getting that decision overruled. And worse still, when the decision 
in question is a highly controversial constitutional decision, the
thought occurs not merely to astute counsel but to the President 
who appoints the new Justice, to the Senators who confirm him, and
to the lobbying groups that have the power to influence both . . . .
That could not happen, or at least it could not happen as readily, if
the individual decisions of all the Justices were not known.118 
The fight to fill Justice Scalia’s own seat best illustrates his point.
Having written the most concurrences and third most dissents in
Supreme Court history, Scalia was vaguely familiar to many Americans.
Upon his untimely death, the challenge to ensure a continued 5-4 
political balance at the Court resulted in an unprecedented stand-off 
between the President and Congress. The genesis for this stand-off, as 
Scalia predicted, can be attributed—at least in part—to the increase in 
separate opinion writing.119 As one article explained, “the level of 
dissension on the Court affects how it is perceived by the legislature 
and executive as well as by the public through the lens of the media.”120 
No longer do we function with “one Supreme Court.” Today, we rely 
115. Richard Lowell Nygaard, The Maligned Per Curiam: A Fresh Look at an Old Colleague, 
5 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 41, 47 (1994–95).
 116. James Markham, Against Individually Signed Judicial Opinions, 56 DUKE L.J. 923, 925 
(2006) (internal citations omitted).
 117. Scalia, supra note 22, at 39. 
118. Id. 
119. See Markham, supra note 116, at 924 (“Critics have accused judges of occupying center
stage in the red state-blue state culture war and of promoting a cult of personality inappropriate
for a neutral and unbiased arbiter.”). Indeed, the Justices levy similar accusations against one 
another—and when they do, the fuzzy contours of a problem begin to take shape.
 120. Smyth & Narayan, supra note 55, at 81.
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on nine “separate law offices, with individual Justices elaborating their 
own views, and feeling freer to express those views in public.”121 
Marshall’s approach of issuing a single court opinion saying “what
the law is” was both truly democratic—only the winner wrote—and
non-activist. Increasingly it seems that modern justices use their 
separate opinions to influence public opinion, press their individual
brand, or seek to change settled law.122 Sadly, this happens most in those 
cases where dissension only undermines the objectivity of the Court 
and its members.123 The Pentagon Papers case,124 Bush v. Gore,125 
126 127Lawrence v. Texas, District of Columbia v. Heller, Obergfell v.
Hodges128 and Trump v. Hawaii129 quickly come to mind. When the
country needed certainty and assurance in the non-political nature of 
legal decision-making, the Court failed.130 More accurately, the justices 
failed. 
Rather than bring the country together like Chief Justice Earl 
Warren in ensuring that Brown v. Board of Education had the full
support of “one Supreme Court,” the modern Court displays comfort 
in disagreement. When the country needed to know that the Court had 
done its job saying “what the law is,” the separate opinion writers— 
those whose intellectual arguments did not win the moment—struck
out against their colleagues, attacked the process, undermined the 
institutional legitimacy of the Court and added instability rather than 
certainty.131 
121. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 791. 
122. See Linda Greenhouse, Appealing to the Law’s Brooding Spirit, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 
1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/06/weekinreview/appealing-to-the-law-s-brooding-spirit
.html. (analyzing the Court’s “separate expressions of individual Justices, concurring or dissenting 
opinions that sought not so much to influence the outcome of the case at hand as to plant a thought
or start a fresh conversation”).
 123. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 116, at 943 (“Predicting a case’s outcome based on who
might be authoring the opinion is symptomatic of a Court whose members are too easily placed
in neat ideological categories.”).
124. New York. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
125. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Much like the Pentagon Papers case, Bush v. Gore was
styled as a per curiam opinion but spawned numerous, separate opinions. It spanned 61 pages.
 126. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (spanning 49 pages). 
127. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (spanning 157 pages). 
128. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (spanning 103 pages).
 129. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (spanning 92 pages).
 130. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 808 (“The 5-4 division in Bush v. Gore, with a split along
ideological lines, created serious concern in part for that reason. We could speculate that a 
unanimous decision, or an 8-1 decision, would have given more people the impression that the
law, understood neutrally, compelled the result.”).
 131. See Maveety, supra note 2, at 139 (observing that “[j]udicial intellectual integrity, it
would seem, demands a revised understanding of judicial institutional integrity”).
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Concurrences pose the greatest risk.
Unlike dissent, which is viewed as a cherished part of the common
law tradition, concurrence receives a less warm reception from
scholars and jurists alike. Not only is it more destructive of
institutional integrity and more invidious with respect to legal
clarity, aspects of the [concurrences] seem difficult to understand as
anything other than judicial egoism.132 
Little, empirically or institutionally, is gained through concurrences. 
What good does this individual approach serve? Institutionally,
concurrences can be discrediting.133 Judge Learned Hand thought that 
on constitutional matters, division on the Court was “disastrous”
because it cancelled “the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the 
authority of a bench of judges so largely depends.”134 And in the larger 
civil society, separate opinions can polarize factions that rely on the 
Court to rise above politics and objectively decide legal disputes.135 
Whatever the driving factor, the Court is risking its institutional
integrity as judicial individuality and celebrity rises. Are the justices 
simply becoming nine more political actors in our constitutional 
structure? 
Chief Justice Roberts appreciates this risk. “In deciding to resist the 
politicization of the judiciary, Roberts acknowledged, he has set himself 
another daunting task; but he said he views it also as a ‘special 
opportunity,’ especially in our intensely polarized age. ‘Politics are 
closely divided,’ he observed. ‘The same with the Congress.There ought 
to be some sense of some stability, if the government is not going to 
polarize completely. It’s a high priority to keep any kind of partisan 
divide out of the judiciary as well.’”136 
Unfortunately, today’s justices seemingly mirror our highly 
polarized society. We expect more from the Court. We need more.
132. Id. at 138.
 133. See Rosen, supra note 11 (“Throughout its history, [Chief Justice] Roberts argues
convincingly, the Court has best served itself—and the nation—when its individual justices have
been willing to subordinate their own agendas in the interest of building judicial consensus and
institutional legitimacy.”).
 134. Smyth & Narayan, supra note 55, at 81.
135. See Lebovits et al., supra note 14, at 262 (“A judge must also be careful not to stray into
politics when writing an opinion. The decision should focus only on the issue before the court and
not what the legislature should not be doing, or discuss political realities outside the case.”).
 136. Rosen, supra note 11.
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III. THE ANTI-MAJORITARIAN NATURE OF SEPARATE OPINIONS
Separate opinion writing, particularly when undermining the
majority opinion, is anti-democratic. In modern Supreme Court 
practice, the rule of five governs.137 If five justices agree on an outcome,
that result becomes legally binding on the parties then before the
Court.138 If five justices agree on both the outcome and the underlying
reasoning for that outcome, the opinion becomes the law of the land.139 
Despite this rule of five, justices continue to write individually and 
undermine this majoritarian approach. Justices who disagree with the 
result should respect the fact that their preferred result or reasoning 
did not win the necessary votes. Theirs is the minority, and non-
successful, opinion. The rule of five is democracy in action. 
The risk of individual writing—beyond its anti-majoritarian spirit— 
is that either readers will be unable to ascertain the Court’s holding or 
the opinion will fail to muster the support of five justices, thereby 
creating a plurality opinion. As Justice Powell explained, “each Justice
has a responsibility to the Court as an institution to help form a 
majority wherever this can be done without sacrifice of principle or 
conviction. The Court is not best served by plurality or fractionated 
opinions.”140 The justices’ separate opinions expressing individual 
preferences heightens the risk of plurality opinions. “Plurality opinions 
were a rare thing in the early history of the Supreme Court—so rare, in
fact, that fewer than forty-five of them were handed down between 
1800 and 1956. Since then, they have become a fairly frequent 
occurrence, complicating the ability of lower courts and practitioners 
to determine what a majority of the Justices had agreed on in a 
particular case.”141 Today plurality opinions are commonplace. In far 
too many cases, the Roberts Court disagrees amongst itself and
137. See Note: Judgments of the Supreme Court Rendered by a Majority of One, 24 GEO. L.J.
968, 985–87 (1936) (observing that proposals to change the simple majority rule have been
previously raised, and died, in Congress). In the early 19th Century, seven proposals were
introduced that would require some version of a super-majority to overturn legislation. While
these proposals all failed, they demonstrate that Congress has some role, even if that role is merely
symbolic, in the Court’s rule of five. 
138. Thomas B. Bennett et al., supra note 21, at 822.
 139. See id. at 839–41 (reminding that under the Rule of Five, concurring opinions do not
become binding precedent).
140. James F. Spriggs, II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 
529 (2011).
141. Estreicher & Webb, supra note 96, at 237.
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 452020] GOODBYE TO CONCURRING OPINIONS
publishes multiple competing opinions. The curious thing remains that
even though the Court disagrees, “it cannot settle on a reason why.”142 
In Marks v. United States, the Court noted that “[w]hen a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the 
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may
be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgements on the narrowest grounds.’”143 The so-called “Marks”
rule, or the “narrowest grounds” test, exposes the greatest mischief of 
concurring opinions—an ability to undermine decisional clarity. The 
Court had a chance to provide additional guidance on the “Marks” rule 
and plurality opinions during it 2019 Term.144 However, the Court 
sidestepped the issue and refused to clarify the Marks test. The 
confusion created by plurality opinions supports my thesis:  the justices 
should stop publishing concurring opinions. 
The Court’s role is to decide cases—not make law or debate what 
the law should be.145 Marbury properly explained that “it is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.” On this point, most agree.146 Judicial activism has a
negative connotation. It suggests that Court is just another political 
body without the ability to objectively evaluate our enduring
constitution. Yet Justice Scalia argued that: 
In our system, it is not left to the academicians to stimulate and
conduct discussion concerning the validity of the Court’s latest
ruling.The Court itself is not just the central organ of legal judgment, 
it is center stage for significant legal debate. In our law schools, it is
not necessary to assign students the writings of prominent
academics in order that they may recognize and reflect upon the 
142. Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 120 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting from plurality opinion).
143. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal citations omitted).
144. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018).
145. See Lebovits et al., supra note 14, at 256 (“A judicial opinion should resolve only the 
pertinent controversy and not discuss superfluous matters.”).
 146. See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Concurring in Part & Concurring in the Confusion, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1951, 1955 (2006) (“[L]et us begin with the-hopefully not controversial-statement that
the principal job of the Supreme Court is to decide cases by making judgments. Coming in a strong
second is the duty to issue opinions, which ‘are simply explanations of those judgments or those 
votes on judgments.’”) (internal citations omitted). But see Bennett et al., supra note 21, at 822 
(observing that “[r]ather than the excess verbiage of judges who cannot control the need to speak 
separately, at the expense of the clarity and authority of the law, they are essential beacons and
harbingers of legal stasis and legal change alike. They signal to litigants and lawyers where there
are possibilities for movement in the law, and where there are not, which issues to bring to court
and which to avoid.”). These authors see a positive role in concurring opinions, especially what 
they classify as the “pivotal” concurrence. Id. at 820.
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principal controversies of legal method or of constitutional law.
Those controversies appear in the opposing opinions of the
Supreme Court itself, and can be studied from that text.147 
Scalia’s vision was for the Court to serve as part of the ongoing legal 
conversation.148 This approach expands Judge Aldisert’s notion that 
judicial opinions are simply “performance utterances”—explanations 
for a legal ruling.149 Judges that use their individual opinions to debate 
or stir brewing constitutional matters come dangerously close to issuing 
advisory opinions. The Court’s job is not to openly debate and discuss 
what the law should be. It is to decide concrete cases and controversies.
Expanding written opinions beyond decisional duties leads to more
legal mischief than masterpiece.
“Opinions are not law-review articles, historical treatises, or op-ed
pieces.”150 Justices wanting to contribute to the legal debate should
consider whether drafting a separate opinion in a live case or 
controversy is the appropriate vehicle. “[T]here comes a point at which
the Justices’ individual personae eclipse their collective institutional
role, and at which justice seems less equal when an opinion is read 
differently depending on who wrote it.”151 As legal opinions grow in 
individuality, length and confusion, perhaps a resort to legal journals— 
all of which would welcome a justice’s individual ideas on debating the 
law—would better protect the Court’s institutional integrity.
The role of the Court is not to engage in legal debate. Courts decide
actual cases. The Court’s primary role is not to appeal to the future but 
to ensure that today’s Constitution is objectively evaluated. The move
to a “system of separate opinions has made the Supreme Court the 
central forum of current legal debate, and has transformed its reports 
from a mere record of reasoned judgments into something of a History
of American Legal Philosophy with Commentary.”152 This elevation of 
individual justices from the position of judicial decision maker to legal 
philosophic commentator seems far removed from the Founders’
147. Scalia, supra note 22, at 39. 
148. Cf. Greenhouse, supra note 122.
 149. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Golden Pen Award Acceptance Remarks of the Honorable 
Ruggero J. Aldisert, 15 LEGAL WRITING 1 (2009).   
150. Lebovits et al., supra note 14, at 262.
 151. Markham, supra note 116, at 923. 
152. Scalia, supra note 22, at 40. Most Court observers would find this comment more
expansive than expected from Justice Scalia. But, it was Scalia who famously quipped that he
writes his dissents for law students.
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vision. The Court was formed to resolve cases and controversies—not
simply, or even secondarily, to debate them. 
As one author noted:
[The] people tend ordinarily to think of the Court as something
much more than an aggregate of nine statesmen of high rectitude
and learning in the law. They think of it as a court, as a tribunal, as
an organic whole. For constitutional leadership they look not to an
aggregation of nine individual leaders but to an organic unit of one 
tribunal, one court. To the extent of its inability to integrate into
decisions and into opinions of the Court the best that individual
justices have to offer, the Court fails the people and fails in
fulfillment of its proper function of leadership.153 
In the modern era where none of the arguments supporting
separate opinion writing seemingly bear fruit, it may be time for the
justices to evaluate their individual roles in opinion writing. Perhaps the 
time has come for self-reflection. 
IV. THE CALL FOR REFORM
The Roberts Court has written five of the eleven longest Supreme 
Court opinions.154 This statistic is even more pronounced when 
realizing that the Roberts Court is one of the least productive in history,
deciding fewer cases than past Courts.155 While the Roberts Court 
resolves fewer actual controversies, it seems dedicated to explaining
those decisions with more words and more separate writings. Why the
disconnect? These justices have more generous resources—from the
most law clerks, to the most advanced technology for research and 
writing—than all previous Courts.156 The case filings may be larger, but 
153. ZoBell, supra note 32, at 207. 
154. See Ten of the Longest Supreme Court Decisions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2010), http://
www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2010/11/18/us/18rulingsGrfxB.html?action=click&contentCollect 
ion=U.S.&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article. The New York
Times chart provides the following list: Buckley v. Valeo, 76,639 words; McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission, 70,228 words; Furman v. Georgia, 66,233 words; McDonald v. Chicago
(Roberts Court), 58,597 words; Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Bd., 58,404 words; 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 51,628 words; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Roberts Court), 50,096 words; Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 48,878 words; Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (Roberts
Court), 48,686 words; Parents Involved v. Seattle (Roberts Court), 47,235 words. This 2010 chart
omits the 2012 decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519
(2012), the so-called Obamacare case, which is 52,395 words.
 155. Meg Penrose, Overwriting and Under-Deciding: Addressing the Roberts Court’s 
Shrinking Docket, 72 SMU L. REV. FORUM 8, 8–10 and 13–14 (2019). 
156. At least one author suggests that the law clerks are partially to blame for the increase in
separate writing. See Maveety, supra note 2, at 145. The justices, however, are the ones that
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there is more support than ever to help address these increases. And if 
the workload is overwhelming, why do these justices focus their limited 
energies on publishing so many separate opinions? When 
overextended and pressed for time, one would think the opportunity
costs of writing separately would be seriously reconsidered. 
The recent case challenging President Trump’s Executive Order 
limiting foreign nationals’ entry into the United States underscores the 
ongoing problem.157 Much like this article’s opening illustration, the 
Roberts Court continues the tradition of cases that open with the 
following designation:
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
KENNEDY, THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.
KENNEDY, J., and THOMAS, J., filed concurring opinions.
BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined.
SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG,
J., joined.158 
In both illustrations, the Chief Justice wrote the majority opinion.
In both illustrations, the Court is openly fractured.The Trump v. Hawaii
justices, unable to muster more than a 5-4 majority, added unnecessary 
length and dialogue to the opinion in near seriatim fashion. And, in a 
much-anticipated opinion, the Court provided us with 5 separate
opinions totaling 87 pages and nearly 26,000 words.159 This trend is 
disheartening. Individual writing should yield to institutional clarity.
The modern urge to write separately seems unmoored from its 
historical legacy, one that was forever altered by Chief Justice
Marshall’s move toward an opinion of the Court.160 Surely most cases 
do not necessitate separate writing. Whether these separate opinions 
ultimately sign on to an opinion. Thus, even if law clerks encourage separate writings, it is the 
justices themselves that bear the ultimate decisional (and writing) responsibilities. 
157. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2017).
 158. Id. 
159. Id. The Chief Justice’s majority opinion is 39 pages. Justice Kennedy filed a 2 page
concurrence. Justice Thomas filed a 10 page concurrence. Justice Breyer filed an 8 page dissent.
And Justice Sotomayor filed a 28 page dissent.  
160. See Nygaard, supra note 115, at 41 (calling “dysfunctional” the fact that modern 
“appellate judges think of ‘their’ opinions rather than opinions ‘by the court’”). “The
consequence is an unfortunate blending of judicial ego into the institutional mixture.” Id. Judge
Nygaard continued, “each of us is tempted to make each opinion our own literary creation. The
problem is that few among us are really literary creators; and what we produce is not literature.” 
Id. at 42. 
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are driven by ego,161 politics,162 law clerks,163 celebrity,164 technology,165 a 
desire to be part of the legal “conversation,”166 or the refusal to accept 
democratically achieved defeat, they need to stop. A return to seriatim 
opinions poses institutional risks. And, the opportunity costs—borne 
both by the justices (in writing) and lawyers (in reading) lengthy 
opinions rife with obiter dictum—hardly seem worth the energy.167 
While technology has eased the ability to draft court opinions, the 
editorial pen should still be liberally employed.
Because the Roberts Court has a growing problem with its opinions,
reform is necessary. Ideally, the justices would voluntarily agree to reign 
themselves in and stop publishing concurring opinions.168 While
dissents, particularly when drafted by every member of the dissent,
pose similar problems regarding opportunity costs, clarity and civility,
they are at least defensible as taking issue with the result. If justices feel 
161. See Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 139 (noting that separate opinions may “nourish a judge’s 
ego”).
162. See Lebovits et al., supra note 14, at 270 (“A judge must also be careful not to stray into
politics when writing an opinion. The decision should focus only on the issue before the court and
not what the legislature should not be doing, or discuss political realities outside the case.”).
 163. See Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 148–49; see also Maveety, supra note 2, at 14 (describing 
notes from former clerks).
164. From the RBG phenomenon to Justice Scalia’s statement that he wrote his dissenting
opinions for “law students,” one cannot deny that some of the modern justices enjoy popular
notoriety. This issue is not new. Writing in 1938, Seventh Circuit Judge Evans lamented that some
judges write separately due to the “publicity bug,” noting that the publicity usually goes to the
dissenting justice rather than the majority. See Evans, supra note 40, at 134; see also Nygaard,
supra note 115, at 43 (decrying “the personality cult of the signed opinion”); Markham, supra note 
116, at 924 (“There is no shortage of attention paid to the Justices’ personal lives; a multiplicity
of web logs (blogs) is devoted to everything from judges’ jurisprudence to their appearance and
personalities.”).
 165. See Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 149.
 166. See Robert F. Blomquist, Concurrence, Posner-Style: Ten Ways to Look at the 
Concurring Opinions of Judge Richard A. Posner, 71 ALB. L. REV. 37, 40 (2008) (observing that
sometimes a concurrence is written to compete “with other judges and academics in the legal
marketplace of ideas”).
 167. See, e.g., West, supra note 146, at 1956 (“Assuming that a separate writing indicates some
amount of divergence from the majority opinion, whether greatly in substance or minimally in
emphasis, the reader must then search for further clues to determine the extent of the justice’s
departure.”).
 168. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 11. Chief Justice Roberts has noted the celebrity factor in
issuing individual opinions. “The focus on justices as personalities—demanded by the public and
cultivated by some justices—directly challenges Roberts’s view that justice itself should be
impersonal.” Id. The current justices should heed his warning: “What you’re trying to establish— 
wearing black robes and, in earlier times, wigs—[is] that it’s not the person; it’s the law.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). “To persuade individual justices to resist the pressures to
promote themselves rather than the interests of the Court as a whole, [Roberts] will have to
appeal, in different ways, to their respective self-interests, and to a broader understanding of their 
judicial role.” Id. 
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the unyielding need to formalize their displeasure with the majority’s 
reasoning, they should either dissent or simply dubitante. A short 
dubitante notation would relieve a justice of his or her principled 
disagreement with the majority approach while simultaneously
accepting the majoritarian nature of the Court. And, when a justice 
feels strong enough that a dubitante falls short of their principled
disagreement, they should consider dissenting or seeking the requisite 
5 votes to make their opinion the Court’s opinion. 
In this era of celebrity justices,169 with multiple law clerks and the 
technological ease of “cutting and pasting” litigants’ and amici’s briefs,
it is unlikely the Court will rein itself in. Thus, more formalized reform 
is necessary.To underscore the legal profession’s actual costs in reading,
analyzing, and teaching the Court’s complex and fractured opinions,
the ABA should reinstate Judicial Canon 19.170 Canon 19 was drafted
in 1924, before concurring opinions were commonplace.171 Still, the call 
for self-restraint in separate opinion writing rings true today:
19. Judicial Opinions.
It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of last resort 
should use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of
conclusion and the consequent influence of judicial decision. A
judge should not yield to pride of opinion or value more highly his
individual reputation than that of the court to which he should be
loyal. Except in case of conscientious difference of opinion on
fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be discouraged in
courts of last resort.172 
The ABA has provided guidance to federal judges for many years.
Today, the ABA plays a role in evaluating federal judicial nominees’
qualifications to serve on the bench to which they are nominated. This 
recommendation, while not mandatory, is often regarded as an 
important factor in assessing a particular judge’s suitability for an 
Article III, life-tenured position. And as the preeminent national 
169. See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note 21, at 826 (“Suppressing separate opinions keeps the 
focus on the court as an institution. It is sometimes said that in systems allowing for separate
opinions—particularly the United States—there is a cult of personality surrounding certain
individual judges.”).
170. American Bar Association, Canon of Judicial Ethics (1924), available at
www.americanbar.org.
 171. Id. 
172. Id. 
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lawyers’ organization, it may be time to return to the ABA’s wisdom 
calling for judicial self-restraint.173 
Like Chief Justice Rehnquist, I seek to “appeal to present and
future brethren [and sistren] to see the light” about separate opinion
writing.174 The overindulgence of separate opinion writing should
stop.175 It is not merely a consequence of the substantive nature of the
pending cases, since the Court controls its own docket. This has been
true since 1925 when Congress gave the Court near complete control 
over the cases it decides. The country has grown, but the cases are no 
more complex. Past Courts dealt with world war,176 war crimes,177 the
Japanese internment,178 mandatory flag salutes,179 desegregation,180 
abortion,181 the Vietnam War and its attendant protests,182 the Selective
Service Act and the mandatory draft,183 gender discrimination,184 and 
other hot-button issues that divided our country. Ours is now an
integrated society where the legal and social issues remain intensely 
debated.  Modern cases, however, are no more consequential than those
that preceded the Roberts Court. The cases aren’t different. The 
justices’ writing habits are.
173. Nygaard, supra note 115, at 49 (lamenting that Canon 19 was “scrapped too soon”).
 174. Rehnquist, supra note 89, at 363.
 175. See, e.g., Nygaard, supra note 115, at 47. (observing that “nothing requires [appellate
judges] to personify the opinion, to employ nifty zingers gleaned from the pages of Roget’s, or to
sprinkle it with apropos-sounding quotes, which unfortunately show less that the writer is well 
read than that he or she has a Bartlett’s. All that is needed is an understandable, to-the-point
explanation—preferably a short one.”).
 176. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (finding 
unconstitutional President Truman’s seizure of most of the nation’s steel plants during wartime 
because neither the Constitution nor Congress afforded him such power). 
177. See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (deciding U.S. courts have no power to
review Japanese citizens’ convictions imposed by an international military tribual located in
Japan).   
178. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding an Executive Order
removing and relocating Japanese-Americans for national security purposes during wartime). 
179. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause protects students from being forced to salute the American
flag or say the Pledge of Allegiance in public school). 
180. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down the “separate 
but equal” doctrine by finding segregation in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
 181. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a woman’s limited right to an abortion).  
182. See Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (finding the First
Amendment protected students’ right to silent, non-disruptive protest in public schools). 
183. See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding the Selective Service Act of
1917).
 184. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down the Virginia Military 
Institute’s longstanding men-only admissions policy). 
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CONCLUSION
Today’s justices are more inclined to publish separate opinions than 
their predecessors. They do not want to read lengthy briefs but appear 
willing to publish lengthy opinions. Yet the justices owe us clarity. They 
should want the law to be understandable—and understood. They 
should voluntarily return to functioning as “one Supreme Court”
rather than continuing to publish increasingly individualized opinions.
Justices, like their legislative and executive counterparts, should be 
forced to make difficult decisions. They should be forced to choose
sides in a dispute. Either side with the majority or join the dissent. The
middle ground permitting separate opinion writing may be uniquely 
American, but, if people cannot understand “what the law is,” the 
justices have failed us.
It is time for the Roberts Court to come together. The 
unconstrained ability to publish individual opinions in every case, for 
any reason, must yield to clarity and institutional responsibility. It is 
time to say goodbye to concurring opinions. 
